.Steady as We Go
Do not take counsel of your fears.Back to the War on Saddam Hussein Page
April 7, 2003 2:00 p.m1. Shouldn't we be afraid of unending terrorism in the streets of Baghdad after our victory?
Not really. The model of occupation need not be Stalingrad, Beirut, or Mogadishu. In fact, usually there is not prolonged terrorism following the fall of most cities, whether Constantinople, Richmond, or even Saigon. The key is either the use of overwhelming force or proof of liberation — or, as in our case, preferably both. In street-to-street fighting so far Americans, not Iraqis, have turned out to be the real scary fighters — and Baghdad is more an open suburban environment without high-rises and the winding streets of medieval cities. The resistance is not grassroots, but made up of desperate Saddamites who have nowhere to go, fearing their own oppressed more than they do us.
2. But why aren't the Iraqis all coming out en masse to support us?
Many are. But given our recent history in not backing the Shiites and Kurds, Saddam's oppressed, like Germans on the Rhine in 1945, gauge how long they are going to keep their dictator's pictures on the wall by the ebb and flow of battle. Who in the first few days would be so reckless to profess affinity for us as we race by, only to deal with Baathist holdouts behind? Remember that professed support for Saddam will not draw reprisals from us while proof of revolt means death from him.
3. But what about the jihadists from Syria, Egypt, or Jordan? Won't we be swarmed by thousands from the Arab Street?
They may meet the same fate as those who left Pakistan to join the Taliban in Afghanistan. Jihadists are much more vulnerable in transit in the desert than terrorists traversing the Khyber Pass. News of their fate in Iraq when they met U.S. Marines will be a powerful argument for others to stay put. And a small, non-nuclear Syria or Jordan is far more receptive to American pressure to keep its citizens out than was Pakistan.
4. Shouldn't we worry about suicide bombers?
Of course. Yet there are only a limited number of people willing to kill themselves for a dictator. The present cohort of self-professed killers so far lacks the zeal of the West Bank murderers and the state infrastructure of the Kamikazes. If anything, their sporadic presence only cements the case that Iraq was a terrorist state and was seen as such by fellow terrorists.
5. But won't the Baathists retreat to strongholds and wage war for years?
They said that about Hitler's National Redoubt. Some Union generals feared fanatics like Nathan Bedford Forrest would wage guerrilla war for generations. In fact, it is rare for the defeated to press on in a hopeless cause against a democratic victor. Remember that noisy Iraqi Baathist elites who have experienced little pain in the war but greatly fear the peace are rarely accurate barometers of what their soldiers who have suffered will do.
6. Shouldn't we worry about the torching of the northern oil wells or some such last final nightmare?
So far the speed of the American advance and its skill, not just Baathist restraint, has saved the bridges, damns, and oil fields. We essentially overran the country in ten days; and while that seemed slow (!) to Americans, it may well have caught the Iraqi demolition units off guard. The wonder was not that bridges and wells were mined, but that they were not exploded. Iraqis may not profess love for Americans, but that does not mean they will blow up their own treasures on orders from an impotent tyrant. The very fact that we spared infrastructure in a strange way proved a restraining force on Saddam's own henchmen, who in worry over public outcry or eventual moral accounting feared that they should not do what we would not.
7. Aren't we losing the propaganda war?
Anytime we bomb, of course, we will be criticized. But the looming end of the war will begin to the reverse the dynamic of the coverage — as reports emerge of mass graves, torture chambers, weapons of mass destruction, interviews with Saddam's victims, tons of American food and aid, and the birth of reform government. And it could shift quite radically once shocked Iraqis accept that Saddam is gone, and that the buildings and homes of their oppressors are in shambles and their own are mostly spared — a gradual improvement in public opinion will allow us a year or so to establish a legitimate government. The worry should not be about Arab public opinion but rather about the American Street — which is slowly simmering and may, if we are not careful, wish to tire of the Middle East and its current insanity altogether.
8. But didn't all the hard fighting and destruction of Saddam's forces ensure years of bitterness?
The opposite is more likely. Don't assume that Baathists, Republican Guardsmen, and terrorist gangs were remotely popular. In fact, tragic as it is given the human costs, the ruin of most of these groups will make the reconstruction easier than had they just given up or escaped. The problem in Afghanistan was that too many Taliban simply surrendered or fled rather than fought and perished — and so are reconfiguring as we let down our guard. We may not wish to accept the brutal nature of man, but the very fact that American troops have fought so well and proved so deadly will have a positive effect in discouraging resistance — the opposite, in other words, of being blown up in Beirut and then retreating from Lebanon.
9. Don't we have too few ground troops to finish off Saddam and occupy the country?
Probably not. And unlike Saddam's forces our numbers are growing, not shrinking. No one yet has calibrated the force multiplying effect of precision-guided bombs dropped in tactical situations against individual tanks, guns, and trucks. But obviously 1,000 planes streaking over Iraq seems to be worth an armored division at least and maybe much more. The very sight of American aircraft in the sky and the knowledge of the accuracy of their bombs have had a frightening psychological effect upon thousands of Iraqi soldiers. The current diplomatic wrangling is over various groups abroad wanting to rush in and establish a presence in postwar Iraq, not their isolationism.
10. How can we restore order with casual shooting?
As the methodical British approach suggests, by containing hostile pockets, restoring civil society and being almost disdainful of the presence of remnant enemies, we in fact further isolate resistance. Critics allege that we are moving too fast with humanitarian aid before the shooting stops; but as Afghanistan teaches us, the key is to move faster than slower both as a way of winning hearts and minds and isolating and discrediting enemy holdouts. In this regard, don't believe simplistic allegations that we are insensitive cowboys unlike the more experienced British; at times British troops are forced to storm into private homes while Americans emerge from tanks to wade in amid children — and vice versa.
These are difficult times of jarring, instantaneously broadcast images of friendly fire, civilian casualties, the tragic deaths of brave journalists, accidents, and wrongheaded analyses of discredited politicians and pundits. But if we keep our heads, stay true to our values, and persevere in our military mission, we will get through this final stage fine — and have done a great and rare good both for us and millions abroad.
http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson040703.asp
